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IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS:
WHAT STATE V. PAREDEZ MEANS TO NEW MEXICO
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
TYLER ATKINS*

I. INTRODUCTION
The recent trend toward stricter federal immigration policies has sparked a highly
partisan national dialogue. Arguments from both sides have given rise to a wide
array of legal questions at both the federal and the state level. In particular, cases
dealing with the failure of counsel to advise non-citizens of immigration
consequences of guilty pleas have received a great deal of judicial attention.' The
courts that have considered this issue are not in complete agreement about the scope
of defendants' constitutional rights, but the majority rule is that "attorneys are not
required to address immigration consequences with their clients at all."2
In State v. Paredez,3 the New Mexico Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the
majority rule.4 It held that defense counsel's failure to inform clients about the
immigration consequences of guilty pleas "will be ineffective assistance of counsel
if the defendant suffers prejudice by the attorney's omission."5 The court further
clarified that "[Paredez's] attorney had an affirmative duty to determine his
immigration status and advise him that he almost certainly would be deported if he
pleaded guilty to criminal sexual contact of a minor."6 The court's decision was both
progressive and rightfully sensitive to the pitfalls of being a non-citizen inhabitant
of the United States.
This Note examines the background of the issues presented in Paredez and pays
careful attention to how other jurisdictions have treated immigration consequences
of guilty pleas. Additionally, it discusses the New Mexico Supreme Court's
rationale for coming to its decision and argues that the court's conclusion may be
viewed as a workable compromise for trial judges and defense attorneys. It warns,
however, that, because the decision in Paredez was based on federal law, it runs the
risk of being overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, this Note considers the
implications of the Paredez decision for New Mexico criminal defense attorneys.

* Class of 2007, University of New Mexico School of Law. Thanks to Professors Barbara Blumenfeld and
Elizabeth Rapaport for their help and guidance; to Scott Davidson for convincing me that even federalism can be
interesting; to the 2005-2006 New Mexico Law Review editorial board; to my parents, Tom and Pauline; and to
Tiffany M. Mercado.
1. See generally John J. Francis, Failureto Advise Non-Citizens ofImmigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Should This Be Groundsto Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MicH. J.L REFORM 691 (2003) (analyzing
case law dealing with immigration consequences of criminal convictions and guilty pleas decided in various federal
and state jurisdictions around the United States).
2. Id. at 724. The minority rule is to either enforce a duty not to misinform or to require affirmative
investigation and advisement regarding immigration consequences. Id. at 724-25.
3. 2004-NMSC-036, 101 P.3d 799.
4. See id. 19, 101 P.3d at 805.
5. Id.
6. Id. 25, 101 P.3d at 806.
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II. BACKGROUND
In 1990, the New Mexico rules of criminal procedure were amended to include
a provision that prohibited district courts from accepting guilty or no contest pleas
unless the defendant was made aware that such pleas "may have an effect upon" his
or her immigration or naturalization status.7 However, prior to the Paredezdecision
there was no rule regarding the New Mexico criminal defense attorney's role in
advising his or her client about the potential immigration consequences of guilty or
no contest pleas.8
The crux of the problem presented in Paredez was whether a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel is violated when he or she accepts a guilty
plea without first being made aware of its immigration consequences. 9 Immigration
consequences, because they are not determined by the district court, are collateral
and not direct consequences.' ° However, because recent changes in federal
immigration law make certain crimes per se deportable offenses, many criminal
defendants have argued that they have a constitutional right to be informed of the
immigration consequences of guilty pleas."
A. Recent Changes in Immigration Law
The likelihood of deportation consequences following a conviction or a plea has
increased dramatically in recent years. 2 Prior to the 1996 enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 13 and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 14"deportation procedures
applicable to permanent resident aliens convicted of criminal offenses typically
operated in two stages."' 5 At the first stage, the immigration judge decided whether
the person could be deported.16 At the second stage, the person, if deportable, could
seek relief based on his or her personal circumstances. 17After the enactment of the
IIRIRA and the AEDPA, however, more people are considered deportable at the

7. Rule 5-303(E)(5) NMRA (emphasis added). This provision is only applicable to the court itself and
merely requires that the court inform the defendant that a guilty or no contest plea will possibly affect the
defendant's immigration or naturalization status.
8. Prior to the Paredez decision, Rule 5-303(5)(E) provided New Mexico judges with guidance regarding
their duty to inform defendants of possible immigration consequences stemming from guilty or no contest pleas,
but neither this rule nor any other rule placed any specific obligation on the shoulders of New Mexico defense
attorneys. See supra note 7.
9. See infra Part 1l.C.1.
10. See infra Part ll.B (explaining that direct consequences are those punishments determined by the
criminal trial court, whereas collateral consequences are civil penalties that stem from direct consequences). Several
courts have adopted this rationale in determining that counsel's failure to advise a defendant of immigration
consequences does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251,
1257 (10th Cir. 2004).
11. See infra Parts IIA, lI.D.
12. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
13. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
14. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
15. Francis, supra note 1,at 701.
16. Id.
17. Id.

Summer 2006]

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES

OF GUILTY PLEAS

first stage, and relief that used to be available at the second stage "has been all but
eliminated."'"
Such a radical difference in procedure can be attributed to the changes these acts
made to the statutory definition of deportable "aggravated felony" offenses as used
by immigration officials.' 9 In 1988, eight years prior to the passage of the TIRIRA
and the AEDPA, aggravated felonies were initially introduced as grounds for
removal and referred exclusively to murder, drug trafficking, and trafficking in
firearms.20 In 1996, the ITRIRA and the AEDPA dramatically broadened the scope
of deportable aggravated felony offenses.2' Today there are numerous offenses,
some more unexpected than others, classified as aggravated felonies that expose
non-citizens to the imminent threat of deportation.22 Seemingly minor offenses for
which non-citizens have faced the threat of deportation as a result of the "inexorable
machinery of the IIRJRA" include stealing a chicken sandwich, stealing two boxes
of donuts, stealing a fifteen dollar piece of clothing for a baby, and pulling a
woman's hair in a fight over a man. Under these provisions of federal law, the
mere commission of a crime that "result[s] in a 12 month sentence, served or
suspended," triggers virtually per se deportation.24 Because the list of potential
aggravated felonies is so expansive, often neither a criminal defendant nor his or her
defense counsel is aware that a guilty or no contest plea will lead the defendant
directly to the chambers of an immigration judge for a deportation hearing. 25 As a
result of this federal legislation, a conviction of, or a guilty plea to, an "aggravated
felony" by a non-citizen
leads today to nearly per se deportation with virtually no
26
possibility of relief.

id.

18. Id. Many crimes are now comparable to strict liability offenses that result in immediate deportation. See

19. Id. "[O]perative definitions used in criminal courts do not necessarily apply in the immigration context."
Id. at 704. The definition of an "aggravated felony" for federal immigration purposes is entirely distinct from the
term's meaning under state penal codes. See id. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000) (describing the circumstances
under which non-citizens may be deported).
20. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 239
(5th ed. 2005) (citing 101 Stat. 4141).
21. Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J.
1131, 1136-37 (2002).
22. ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER'S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW: QUESTIONS AND

ANSWERS § 5.23 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that courts have found non-citizens subject to deportation for convictions
of drug trafficking; crimes of violence, theft, and burglary; alien smuggling; crimes of fraud or deceit; bribery;
counterfeiting; trafficking in vehicles with altered identification numbers; obstruction of justice; and perjury);
accord 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000) (listing all crimes included in the definition of "aggravated felony").
23. Elizabeth Rapaport, The Georgia Immigration Pardons: A Case Study in Mass Clemency, 13 FED.
SENT'G REP. 184, 184 (2000-2001).

24. Id.; accord8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)() (2000) (stating that a non-citizen may be deported when he
or she is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed).
25. See, e.g., State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 101 P.3d 799. Presumably, both Mr. Paredez and his
attorney felt that three years of supervised probation was a favorable plea deal and were not aware that a guilty plea
to criminal sexual contact of a minor that did not result in incarceration would lead to deportation. See id. 2, 101
P.3d at 801.
26. See Taylor & Wright, supra note 21, at 1137 (stating that a conviction of an aggravated felony bars
discretionary relief for deportation under current law).
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B. The Doctrine of CollateralConsequences
A criminal defendant who is not a U.S. citizen would not likely plead guilty to
an aggravated felony if he or she were cognizant of the fact that deportation would
almost certainly result.2 7 A long-standing norm in the U.S. criminal justice system
is that a criminal defendant who decides to plead guilty or no contest must do so
"with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences"

of the plea.28 Such awareness does not normally include the recognition of civil
penalties, such as deportation, that stem from criminal consequences, also known
as collateral consequences. 29 As a result, plea offers that initially seem exceedingly
fair to a criminal defendant may, in reality, lead to extremely harsh civil penalties.30
Such unexpected consequences raise the question "of whether pleas taken under
such circumstances are knowingly and voluntarily entered.'
Although the U.S. criminal justice system recognizes the constitutional necessity
of assuring that criminal defendants understand the direct consequences of guilty
pleas,32 a similar necessity is not normally extended to collateral consequences.33
Such a requirement does not typically exist despite the fact that collateral consequences have the potential to appear in almost every criminal case 34 and often affect
criminal defendants' lives more profoundly than the direct consequences of a
conviction or plea. 35 Deportation is arguably the most extreme collateral consequence
because of its potential to completely uproot lives and to tear families
36
apart.

Because deportation consequences are determined at immigration hearings and
not at criminal trials, they must be considered civil penalties that stem from criminal
penalties.37 Therefore, in most jurisdictions neither trial courts nor criminal defense

27. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
28. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 40-44
and accompanying text.
29. Collateral consequences have been defined as those consequences that remain "beyond the control and
responsibility of the district court in which that conviction was entered." United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20,
27 (1st Cir. 2000).
30. Francis, supra note 1, at 693-94 (listing deportation and extended exclusion from the United States as
examples of collateral consequences of guilty pleas).
31. Id. at694.
32. Id. at 709. Direct consequences are those that are directly linked to a defendant's criminal trial, such as
imprisonment or probation. See id. at 710.
33. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Due Process Clause only requires the trial court to explain
the direct consequences of a conviction or a guilty plea. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CoRNELL L. REv. 697, 706 (2002). Even though
the Court has never expressly extended the affirmative duty to inform regarding direct consequences to defense
counsel, it is one of the "most widely recognized rules of American law." Id.
34. See id. at 705-06 (listing the following potential collateral consequences of convictions or guilty pleas:
effects on custody, parole ineligibility, civil commitment, registration requirements, disenfranchisement,
disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the military, loss
of business or professional licenses, and deportation).
35. Lea McDermid, Comment, DeportationIs Different: Noncitizens andIneffective Assistance of Counsel,
89 CAL. L. REv. 741, 778 (2001).
36. Id. Deportation has the potential to force people to leave family members behind that happen to be U.S.
citizens. Id. Also, it is not uncommon for deportees to be removed to their countries of legal citizenship where they
do not know anyone or do not even speak the language. Id.
37. See Francis, supra note 1, at 694.

Summer 2006]

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES

OF GUILTY PLEAS

attorneys are required to inform clients about the potential collateral immigration
consequences of guilty or no contest pleas.38
C. ConstitutionalConsiderationsand the Strickland Standardfor Effective
Assistance of Counsel
The root of the problem presented in Paredez begins with whether the criminal
defendant sufficiently understands the consequences of pleading guilty.39 Such an
understanding must at least partially come from both the trial judge and the
defendant's counsel. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has discussed these issues at
length, an overview may reasonably begin at the national level.
1. Sixth Amendment Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Boykin v. Alabama,40 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a plea must be both
voluntary and knowing in order for it to be constitutional.4 ' The Court reasoned that
the requirement of knowledge and volition was crucial because upon entering a
guilty plea a criminal defendant waives a number of fundamental constitutional
rights.42 The following Term, in Brady v. United States,43 the Court reinforced its
holding in Boykin by stating that waiving these rights must not only be voluntary
and knowing but must also be intelligent and "done' with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences."
Because the trial process and procedure can be quite complicated, a criminal
defendant's "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely46
consequences,45 must, in large part, come from the advice of his or her counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution assures criminal defendants the right
to "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."4' 7 At face value, this provision
merely guarantees the right to representation at a criminal trial, but the U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted it to guarantee a general right to "effective"
assistance of counsel."

38. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
39. See State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 1 7, 101 P.3d 799, 802 (discussing the gravity of pleading guilty
and the defendant's rights in pleading guilty).
40. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
41. Id. at242.
42. Id. at 243 (explaining that, upon pleading guilty to a crime, a defendant waives his or her Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, and Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination).
43. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
44. Id. at 748; accordRule 5-303(E)-(F) NMRA (requiring that pleas in New Mexico district courts be both
voluntary and knowing). The problem that Paredez and similar cases encounter is whether virtually per se
deportation stemming from guilty pleas can be considered the type of "likely consequence" discussed in Brady. For
a discussion of the difference between direct and collateral consequences, see supra Part ll.B.
45. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
46. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized that the right

to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
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in Strickland v. Washington,49 the Court created a standard designed to protect
this constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal trials. 50 The
standard consists of a two-prong test. The first prong of the test requires the
defendant to show that "counsel's performance was deficient";5' the second prong
requires a showing that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."52 If
successful in a Strickland claim, the defendant that had previously entered a guilty
plea is allowed to withdraw his or her plea and have a trial by jury.53
In order to satisfy the first prong, a defendant must demonstrate that defense
counsel did not function in accordance with the defendant's Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel.54 In making this showing, a defendant must prove that
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 55 When
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is brought, the general presumption is that
counsel has not fallen below this standard.56 Such a presumption exists to avoid "the
distorting effects of hindsight" 57 and to avoid the litigation of frivolous ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.58
If a defendant is able to satisfy the first prong of the test, the focus moves to the
second prong: the prejudice prong. 9 This prong aims "not to grade counsel's
performance," 6 but rather, to determine whether the deficient performance unfairly
affected the outcome of the proceeding.6 ' In essence, this prong becomes a "but for"
test that requires a defendant to prove that, in the absence of counsel's performance,
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.62 The standard of proof
to make such a showing is one of "reasonable probability,, 63 which the Court

49. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
50. Id. at 687. The Strickland right to effective assistance of counsel at trial was extended to similar claims
arising out of a plea agreement in Hill. 474 U.S. at 58.
51. Strickland,466 U.S. at 687 ("This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.").
52. Id. ("This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.").
53. See, e.g., State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 24, 101 P.3d 799, 806.
54. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
55. Id. at 688.
56. Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, CurrentDevelopments 2003-2004: Wiggins v. Smith: The Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel StandardApplied Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 755,758 (2004).
Courts "grant a great deal of deference to decisions made by counsel during the course of a trial." Id. Strategic
choices made by counsel are not judged on appeal unless they are unreasonable. See id.
57. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
58. Id. at 690 ("The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance... would encourage
the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.").
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
60. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
61. Id. at694.
62. Id. ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."); see also Gable & Green, supra note
56, at 759.
63. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
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defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' If
such a showing is made the defendant is entitled to the appropriate relief.65
2. Effective Assistance Under the New Mexico Constitution
Apart from the Sixth Amendment, a New Mexico criminal defendant can also
bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under article II, section 14 of the
state constitution. 66 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan has stated that "one of the
strengths of [the] federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for
the rights of [its] citizens. 6 7 The federalist system was founded largely on the
division of powers between the state and national governments to defend the rights
of citizens.68 James Madison himself indicated that, in order to maintain the "double
security" of the federal system, the federal courts must be careful not to undercut
state protections of rights.69
While it is true that "state constitutions may always be used to supplement or
expand federally guaranteed constitutional rights,"70 it is also true that "the federal
courts' reading of federal law.. .is decisive."'" The U.S. Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter of federal constitutional questions, but the principles of federalism
preclude it from reviewing decisions resting on state constitutional law that is more
liberal than its federal counterpart.72
The states have developed three different approaches to independent constitutional interpretation: the primacy approach, the lockstep approach, and the interstitial approach. 73 In State v. Gomez, 74 New Mexico adopted the interstitial
approach.75 As a result of accepting this approach, the New Mexico courts may now
"diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis,

64. Id. The Strickland prejudice prong has been criticized for placing "substantial emphasis on whether the
defendant was factually culpable and insufficient emphasis on whether the defendant received a fair trial and was
legally guilty." Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink Drugs, and Drowsiness: The ConstitutionalRight to Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland PrejudiceRequirement, 75 NEB. L REv. 425, 439 (1996).
65. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
66. N.M. CONST. art. IL,§ 14 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend himself in person, and by counsel....").
67. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 503 (1977).
68. Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324,
1344 (1982) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
69. See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 357 (James Madison) (Benjamin Wright ed., 1961)).
70. Id. at 1334 ("Federal law sets a minimum floor of rights below which state courts cannot slip.").
71. Id. at 1333.
72. See id.; see also supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
18, 932 P.2d 1, 7. State courts that utilize the primacy model
73. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,
"consider assertions of federal constitutional rights only after all claims resting on state law have failed to provide
the requested protections." Developments in the Law, supra note 68, at 1356. These courts rely on the principle that
"the states are the primary sovereigns and that state constitutions are the basic charters of individual liberties and
of the limits of governmental authority." Id. at 1357. Other state courts opt for the opposite extreme and take the
lockstep approach to state constitutional interpretation. James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why
Federalism and Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1262 (2005). These courts
"construe provisions of state constitutions to have precisely the same meaning as similar provisions of the U.S.
Constitution." Id.
74. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
75. Id. 1 16, 932 P.2d at 6.
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structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state
characteristics. 7 6
Under this approach it must first be determined whether the U.S. Constitution
protects the right being asserted." If it does, there is no need for the analysis to
continue, but if not, the state constitution must be examined to determine whether
the right asserted is protected there.78 If there is established precedent that would
construe the state provision to provide more protection than its federal counterpart,
"the claim may be preserved by (1) asserting the constitutional principle that
provides the protection sought under the New Mexico Constitution, and (2) showing
the factual basis needed for the trial court to rule on the issue."'7 9
However, in order to preserve a claim in which there is no precedent
differentiating a state constitutional provision from its federal counterpart, "a party
also must assert in the trial court that the state constitutional provision at issue
should be interpreted more expansively than the federal counterpart and provide
reasons for interpreting the state provision differently from the federal provision. 8 °
This was the step that should have been taken, but was not, in Paredez to protect
defendants' right to be informed of the
immigration consequences of guilty pleas
8
under the New Mexico Constitution. '
D. Different Jurisdictions'Interpretationof CollateralImmigration
Consequences
Many defendants that have faced deportation consequences resulting from guilty
pleas to aggravated felonies have claimed that their constitutional rights were
violated when they were not adequately informed of the near certainty of
deportation. 82 They maintained that they were victims of ineffective assistance of
counsel based on Strickland in hopes of withdrawing their guilty or no contest
pleas.83 Courts analyzing this issue have consistently considered deportation a
84
collateral consequence of a guilty or no contest plea to an aggravated felony.
However, courts must now, after the passage of the IIRIRA and AEDPA, take into
account the fact that, "[w]hile deportation and exclusion from the United States may
not fit the technical definition of a direct consequence of a conviction,... deportation
[is] a near certainty for convictions of a broad class of offenses." 85
Despite the veritable certainty of deportation in many cases, federal courts have
overwhelmingly rejected the contention that trial judges have an affirmative duty to

76. Id. 1 19, 932 P.2d at 7.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id. 22, 932 P.2d at 8.
80. Id. 1 23, 932 P.2d at 8.
81. For a discussion of the potential ramifications of protecting the rule in Paredez under the U.S.
Constitution but not under the New Mexico Constitution, see infra Part V.C.
82. E.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002); State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002);
Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921 (Or. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006).
83. See supra note 82.
84. See Francis, supra note 1, at 709 ("IThere is no universal belief that non-citizens must be informed of
the immigration consequences stemming from their pleas.").
85. Id. at 694-95.
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86
inform defendants of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Many state
courts require trial judges to inform criminal defendants that immigration consequences may result from a plea.87 But even in these courts, the requirement is merely
88
to generally advise every defendant that there may be possible consequences. The
argument that the trial court should inform each and every criminal defendant about
89
specific immigration consequences to pleas has overwhelmingly failed.
Despite the fact that trial courts generally do not have the burden of warning noncitizen defendants about deportation consequences, many jurisdictions treat defense
counsel's responsibilities differently.' Since defense counsel has a greater duty than
9
the court in protecting the specific interests, of his or her clients, ' the question
becomes: does defense counsel have a responsibility to advise his or her clients
about the immigration consequences of guilty pleas? Courts around the country have
analyzed three possible scenarios regarding this question: (1) when counsel neglects
to say anything at all about possible consequences,92 (2) when counsel affirmatively
misrepresents immigration consequences, 93 and (3) when counsel gives vague
warnings about possible consequences. 94
Despite the changes that the IIRIRA and the AEDPA have created, many courts
95
are hesitant to stray from a strict reading of the collateral consequences doctrine.

86. See El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276
F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27-28 (Ist Cir. 2000); United States v.
Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1989).
87. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.48 (2001) (listing California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin).
88. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(a) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.385(2)(d) (2003); WiS.
STAT. § 971.08(l)(c) (2004). Jennifer Welch questions the effectiveness of the "generalized, late warning[s]" that
this model offers. Jennifer Welch, Comment, Defending Against Deportation: Equipping Public Defenders to
Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CAL. L REv. 541,555 (2004). This model offers criminal defendants the same
warning regardless of their personal circumstances. See id. Because such a warning becomes a mere formality to
the trial judge, often the criminal defendant is not able to properly consider its weight. See id.
89. See supranote 86. The court in State v. Paredez noted that "it certainly would have been prudent for the
district court to have been more specific in its admonition," but that such a specific advisement was not required
by either the court rules or the U.S. Constitution. 2004-NMSC-036, I 11, 101 P.3d 799, 803.
90. See infra notes 93-94.
91. See MODEL RuLEs OFPROF'L CoNDucr R.I.1(2002) ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client."); id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must ... act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."). However, ethical duties must be distinguished from the
constitutional rights of defendants to effective assistance of counsel. See infra Part VI.B.
92. See, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to advise a
non-citizen of the possibility of deportation as a collateral consequence does not result in Sixth Amendment
deprivation); United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that failing to advise a client of
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, without more, does not render defense counsel's assistance
ineffective).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel's affirmative
misrepresentations about immigration consequences rendered a non-citizen defendant's plea involuntary by
counsel's ineffective assistance).
94. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921, 925 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that by informing a noncitizen defendant that a guilty plea to drug charges "may" make him deportable was ineffective assistance of counsel
because deportation was certain), rev'd, 134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967, 970 (Utah
Ct. App. 2003) (holding that by advising the non-citizen defendant that he "might or might not" be deported after
pleading guilty to sexual battery, defense counsel's performance was ineffective), rev'd, 125 P.3d 930 (Utah 2005).
95. For a general discussion on whether deportation should be considered a direct or collateral consequence,
see Couto, 311 F.3d at 188-90.
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These courts maintain that, regardless of the certain result of deportation, it is still
a collateral consequence because the criminal trial court does not, itself, dole out
deportation sanctions.96 Concluding that counsel's performance is not deficient when
completely failing to inform his or her client that he or she would be deported after
pleading guilty is, therefore, the outcome in these jurisdictions.97
Although some courts consider a failure to advise about immigration consequences to be effective assistance, a distinction must be made between providing no
advice and faulty advice. 98 Some courts have held that affirmative misrepresentations by counsel regarding immigration consequences of guilty pleas meet the firstprong (deficient performance) of the Strickland test. 99 Conversely, the same courts
that consider counsel's performance deficient via misinformation may consider a
complete lack of information regarding immigration consequences sufficient.'0°
Under this rule, the burden is on the client to inquire about possible immigration
consequences that could stem from guilty or no contest pleas."'0 Consequently, the
defense attorney is free to ignore the possible immigration consequence without any
possibility of a future ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Finally, the gray area of this issue involves those instances where counsel informs
a client that deportation is "possible," when it is virtually certain under federal
statutory law. Counsel is arguably wrong, or at least inaccurate, when advising that
deportation may follow from a guilty plea to an aggravated felony. But the ultimate
question is whether this type of advice constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.' 0 2 This was the exact issue that faced the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Paredez.

96. See, e.g., Broomes, 358 F.3d at 1256-57 (explaining that counsel's performance cannot be considered
deficient for failing to advise a client about collateral consequences).
97. See, e.g., id. at 1257.
98. In United States v. Kwan, the Ninth Circuit held that defense counsel's assistance was ineffective. 407
F.3d 1005, 1018 (9th Cir. 2005). In that case, the defendant asked counsel about immigration consequences of a
guilty plea. Id. at 1015-16. Counsel made a faulty affirmative representation that a guilty plea would not lead to
deportation, which the defendant trusted and, as a result, ultimately entered into a guilty plea. Id. at 1016.
99. See, e.g., Couto, 311 F.3d at 184, 188 (holding that counsel's performance was deficient when he advised
his client, who was charged with an aggravated felony, to take care of her criminal problems first and then concern
herself with potential immigration problems). For a general discussion of the Stricklandtest, see supra notes 49-65.
100. See, e.g., Couto, 311 F.3d at 187-88 (distinguishing between the reasonableness of failing to inform
regarding collateral consequences and making affirmative misrepresentations regarding the same consequences).
101. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1015-16 (stressing the defendant's affirmative inquiry regarding possible
immigration consequences and counsel's subsequent misrepresentation).
102. In this type of circumstance, the defendant is warned that deportation might occur but that it is not
certain. This could be construed as faulty advice if the non-U.S. citizen defendant pleads guilty or no contest to an
aggravated felony. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. However, the defendant is not explicitly told that
deportation will not result from a plea. This puts the defendant on notice that his or her immigration status could
be in jeopardy. At least one other court before Paredez has held that this type of attorney advisement is not
sufficient. Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921, 925 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that advisement that a person "may"
be subject to immigration consequences after a guilty plea to drug charges is faulty because it falsely implies that
there is a potentially good chance that the person will not be deported), rev'd, 134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006).
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111. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 2002, Ram6n Paredez, a lawful permanent resident °3 from Guatemala,
was charged with criminal sexual contact of a minor in the third degree."M Several
months later, in February 2003, Mr. Paredez entered a plea agreement with the
district court.0 5 At the plea hearing, both the court and Mr. Paredez's counsel
informed him that a guilty plea "could" affect his immigration status.'06 Despite the
warning, Mr. Paredez proceeded with the plea agreement, which assured him a
suspended sentence.' 0 7 One week after sentencing, on March 3, 2003, Mr. Paredez
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that neither the trial court nor his
attorney adequately informed him about the consequences that his plea would have
on his immigration status. 08 The district court held a hearing to decide the matter
and ultimately issued an order denying the motion." 9 Mr. Paredez appealed the
decision."'
The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed the
district court's decision."' First, the appellate court held that the district court was
not required to give a specific explanation about the possible immigration
consequences of Mr. Paredez's plea. 1 2 Second, the court held that the record was
insufficient to address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel."' Further, it
would not remand the case for a hearing on that issue."'
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari review and remanded the case
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Mr. Paredez's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.1 5 The court held that Mr. Paredez's counsel
had an affirmative duty to inform
Mr. Paredez of the specific immigration
6
consequences of his guilty plea."

103. A "lawful permanent resident alien" is "a person who has immigrated lawfully to the United States."
BILL ONG HING, IMMIGRATION AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 188 (1999). Lawful permanent residents are issued
alien registration receipt cards, commonly referred to as "green cards." Id.
104. State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 2, 101 P.3d 799, 801. Criminal sexual contact of a minor in the
third degree is a third degree felony in New Mexico. NMSA 1978, § 30-9-13(C) (2001).
105. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 2, 101 P.3d at 801.
106. Id.
107. Id. Mr. Paredez was sentenced to three years of incarceration, but, "[c]onsistent with the plea agreement,
he received a suspended sentence and was placed on supervised probation for a period of three years." Id.
108. Id. Mr. Paredez faced almost certain deportation upon pleading guilty to criminal sexual contact of a
minor (a third degree felony). See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000) (stating that one class of deportable aliens
includes those who commit an "aggravated felony"). For background information about this issue, see discussion
in Part I.A, supra.
109. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 2, 101 P.3d at 801.
110. Id.
111. Id.

3, 101 P.3dat801.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.

25, 101 P.3d at 806.

116. Id. 1 19, 101 P.3d at 805. The court explained that counsel's explanation that the plea "could" affect the
immigration status of Mr. Paredez was far different from advising him that his plea would "almost certainly" result
in deportation. Id. 1 21, 101 P.3d at 805-06. However, the district court's similar explanation did not, on its own,
render the defendant's plea constitutionally defective. See discussion in Part IV.A, infra.
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IV. RATIONALE
In reaching its conclusion in State v. Paredez, the New Mexico Supreme Court
considered two distinct issues: (1) "the district court's role in informing criminal
defendants of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea,"' 1 7 and (2) "the role
of criminal defense attorneys' 18in informing their clients of the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea.""
A. The Trial Court's Role in Informing Defendants
The court began its analysis of the district court's role in informing Mr. Paredez
of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea by considering whether the
district court's actions (or inactions) complied with the state court rules.119
Specifically, the court analyzed the district court's duty, under the New Mexico
rules, to offer advice to criminal defendants.' 20 Under the New Mexico rules, "the
court shall not accept a plea of guilty.. .without first, by addressing the defendant
personally in open court, informing the defendant"'121 that if "convicted of a crime,
it may have an effect upon [his or her] immigration or naturalization status."'122 The
court concluded that the district court's warning that Mr. Paredez's guilty plea
"could" affect his immigration status complied with the specific wording of the
applicable New Mexico court rule.' 23
The next step in resolving the first issue involved considering whether the district
court's actions violated the defendant's right to due process of the law. 124 The court
stated that the trial court has the duty to ensure that criminal defendants understand
the direct consequences of a guilty plea but does not have the duty to ensure that
defendants understand the collateral consequences of such a plea.' 25 Furthermore,
the court explained that each federal circuit has either held that deportation is a
collateral consequence or has indicated that it would hold accordingly. 126 The court
concluded that, although
it certainly would have been prudent for the district court to have been more
specific in its admonition to [Mr. Paredez] or to inquire into [his] understanding
of the deportation consequences of his plea ....
the district court was not

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036,
Id. 12, 101 P.3d at 804.
Id. 18, 101 P.3d at 802-03.
Id.
Rule 5-303(E) NMRA.

6, 101 P.3d at 802.

122. Rule 5-303(E)(5) NMRA.
123. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 1 8, 101 P.3d at 802-03.
124. The court noted that a Federal Due Process Clause analysis was proper and that Mr. Paredez "[did] not
provide any reason for interpreting our state due process clause.. differently from its federal counterpart." Id. 6,
101 P.3dat 802. CompareU.S.CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding the states to "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law"), with N.M. CONST. art. IL § 18 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.....).
125. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 9, 101 P.3d at 803 (citing United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C.
Cir. 1982)).
126. Id. For example, the Sixth Circuit Court has explained that, because deportation is not within the direct
control of the district court, it is a collateral consequence. EI-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir.
2002).
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constitutionally required to advise [him] that his guilty plea.. .certainly would
result in his deportation.'27
B. Counsel'sDuty to Inform
After holding that the district court did not have an obligation to inform Mr.
Paredez of the specific immigration consequences of his guilty plea, the court
examined the attorney's role in informing him of those consequences.t 28 Ultimately,
the court decided that the respective duties of the trial court and the defense attorney
are very different.129 Unlike the trial court, Mr. Paredez' s attorney had an affirmative
duty to inform him of the specific deportation consequences of his guilty plea.13 °
The court's analysis began with the examination of the protocol for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.' 3 ' In order to establish such a claim, a defendant must
show that "'counsel's performance was deficient"' and that "'the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."",132 In discussing the first prong of this test (the
Stricklandtest), 133 the court stated that it agreed with the jurisdictions that had held
that affirmative misrepresentations and faulty advice regarding immigration
consequences of guilty pleas were "misleading and thus deficient. '' 1" Additionally,
the court35 held that there could be no "distinction between misadvice and nonadvice." 1
The court supported this holding by explaining that, first, there is only a tenuous
distinction between misadvice and non-advice.' 36 Second, distinguishing between
misadvice and non-advice would tend to encourage attorneys not to give any advice
at all. 137 Finally, not requiring an attorney to advise a client on specific issues would
place a large burden on the client to make sense of complex legal concepts. 3 1 For
those reasons, the court held that, assuming that the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test is met, 139 a criminal defense attorney's failure to provide advice to a
non-citizen client regarding specific immigration consequences of a guilty plea
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.1"°

127. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036,I 11, 101 P.3d at 803.
128. Id. U 12-24, 101 P.3d at 803-06.
129. Id. 125, 101 P.3d at 806.
130. Id. 1 19, 101 P.3d at 805.
131. Id. - 13-14, 101 P.3d at 804.
132. Id. 1 13, 101 P.3d at 804 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
133. For background information regarding the Strickland test, see supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
134. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 15, 101 P.3d at 804.
135. Id. 1 16, 101 P.3d at 804. The holding directly and purposefully contradicts the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the issue. Compare id. with Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1258 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that
failure to advise a non-citizen of the possibility of deportation as a collateral consequence does not result in Sixth
Amendment deprivation).
136. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 17, 101 P.3d at 804-05.
137. Id. 1 17, 101 P.3d at 805.
138.

Id.

139. To prove the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show that "'he would not have
entered into the plea agreement if he had been given constitutionally adequate advice about the effect that his guilty
plea would have on his immigration status."' Id. 1 20, 101 P.3d at 805 (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921, 925
(Or. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006)).
140. Id. 1 19, 101 P.3d at 805. To reach this conclusion the court relied on a federal Sixth Amendment
analysis. Id. This leaves the rule vulnerable to being overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. See infra Part V.C.
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Next, the court applied these rules to the facts of the case. The court explained
that counsel had informed Mr. Paredez that his guilty plea "could" affect his
immigration status but failed to inform him that he "almost certainly would be
deported if the district court accepted his plea agreement.'' Furthermore, the court
concluded that Mr. Paredez "would not have pleaded guilty if he had known
beforehand of this dire consequence."'' 4 2 The court therefore determined that Mr.
Paredez had established a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel'43
and subsequently remanded his case to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing.'"
V. ANALYSIS
New Mexico's newly adopted standard of advising non-citizens as to the
immigration consequences of guilty pleas is more liberal than the majority of other
jurisdictions. 145 Despite the admittedly collateral nature of deportation consequences
of guilty pleas, the New Mexico Supreme Court appropriately likened them to the
direct consequences in requiring defense counsel to advise non-citizen clients of the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea. However, instead of simply shifting the
entire burden to defense counsel, the court might have also heightened the duty of
the trial court to inform.
A. No Requirementfor Trial Court to Specifically Inform
In Paredez, the New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that deportation is
generally considered a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.' 46 While this
classification is fundamentally correct, 47 the extreme severity of deportation makes
a more delicate treatment of the issue necessary.4 8 Upon making this bright-line
distinction between direct and collateral consequences, trial courts are relieved of
the "responsibility to advise a defendant of every possible negative [collateral]
consequence that may result [from a guilty plea]," including the severe consequence
of deportation. 49 This denial of the responsibility to advise defendants of
immigration consequences stemming from guilty pleas reflects the opinion of many
jurisdictions in the United States. 5 °

141. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 121, 101 P.3d at 805.
142. Id. 121, 101 P.3d at 805--06.
143. Id. 22, 101 P.3d at 806.
144. Id. 1 24, 101 P.3d at 806.
145. See, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that deportation is a
collateral consequence and that defense counsel's performance is not deficient in the absence of affirmative advice);
State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145, 1152 (Kan. 2002) (holding that a defense attorney's failure to advise his non-citizen
client of the deportation consequences of his nolo contendere plea did not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel).
146. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 9, 101 P.3d at 803.
147. See supra Part I.B.
148. See Francis, supra note 1, at 714 (arguing that, despite the classification of deportation as either direct
or collateral, it has a profound impact upon the non-citizen defendant's life and should be treated with great care).
149. Jaime Ostroff, Comment, Are Inmmigration Consequencesofa CriminalConvictionStill Collateral?How
the CaliforniaSupreme Court'sDecisionIn re Resendiz Leaves This Question Unanswered,32 Sw. U. L. REv. 359,
362 (2003).
150. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 9, 101 P.3d at 803 ("Each federal circuit that has directly considered the
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The argument in favor of not requiring trial courts to advise non-citizen criminal
defendants of immigration consequences revolves around a "slippery slope"
rationale.' 51 This argument focuses on the plethora of potential collateral consequences that exist and the impossibility of the trial judge to warn defendants about
all of them. 52 Such a requirement would essentially require the trial judge to
thoroughly research and analyze each defendant's individual situation carefully.' 3
The question regarding Paredez becomes whether it is too great a burden for a trial
judge to simply determine each criminal defendant's immigration status.
New Mexico trial judges are required to inform all criminal defendants that a
conviction may affect his or her immigration status."M However, they are not
required to advise defendants with any further precision, 55 despite the fact that
under current immigration law deportation is often "a near certainty for convictions
of a broad class of offenses."' 5 6 One possible solution to bridge the gap between
such boilerplate warnings' 7 and a more effective inquiry would be to amend the
New Mexico court rules to require a more specific line of questioning. The warning
that is currently required is one in a long list that is likely to be overlooked by the
defendant who believes he or she has negotiated a good deal with the prosecutor. A
more effective inquiry would specifically ask the defendant about his or her
immigration status and whether he or she has discussed possible deportation
consequences with counsel. 58 That way the defendant and the defendant's counsel
are put on notice as to possible deportation consequences that the guilty plea may
trigger. However, even if more rigorous requirements regarding these types of
warnings were in place, there would undoubtedly
remain cases in which problems
159
similar to the one in Paredez could arise.
Ideally, to provide an additional safety net for criminal defendants, New Mexico
trial judges would be able to adequately assess all of the possible consequences of
guilty pleas, including immigration consequences. However, Paredez expressly

issue has held that deportation is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty so that the trial court is not required
to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences of his or her plea.").
151. See Francis, supra note 1, at 709 (describing the common argument that the seemingly endless list of
potential collateral consequences would be too burdensome for the trial court to track).
152. Alicia Werning Truman, Note, Unexpected Evictions: Why Drug Offenders Should Be Warned Others
Could Lose Public Housing If They Plead Guilty, 89 IOWA L REv. 1753, 1768 (2004). For a list of potential
collateral consequences that could stem from a conviction or guilty plea, see supra note 34.
153. See Wering Truman, supra note 152, at 1768-69.
154. Rule 5-303(E) NMRA. This type of rule is in place in at least twenty states. Attila Bogdan, Guilty Pleas
by Non-Citizens in Illinois:Immigration ConsequencesReconsidered,53 DEPAULL. REv. 19,49-50(2003) (listing
New Mexico, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, Maine, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin).
155. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 11,101 P.3d at 803.
156. Francis, supra note 1, at 695.
157. See Welch, supra note 88, at 555 (explaining that in giving warnings, similar to those required in New
Mexico, the trial judge does not individually assess the possibility of deportation in any given case).
158. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 33, at 738 (explaining that asking a client about three
topics-citizenship, prior convictions, and government benefits--could quickly and easily cover the vast majority
of potential collateral consequences stemming from a conviction or guilty plea).
159. Hypothetically, a criminal defendant thinking that he or she was receiving a favorable plea bargain may
still be hesitant to admit to being an undocumented immigrant in front of a tribunal, no matter how in depth the line
of questioning may be.
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denied the claim that the district court must specifically advise defendants of
immigration consequences." 6° In doing so, the court did not overlook the problem,
but rather, shifted the entire burden to determine such consequences to defense
counsel.' 6 '
B. New Mexico Defense Counsel's Duties
Although the court in Paredez refused to broaden the trial court's duty to
inform, 62 it created strict guidelines pertaining to defense counsel's duties.163 After
Paredez, New Mexico defense attorneys are forbidden from giving faulty advice
regarding immigration consequences and from giving no advice at all.'64 In choosing
to require such an affirmative duty, the court created a workable rule that should
serve as a model for other jurisdictions. It is far from unreasonable to require
defense counsel to inform clients of possible harsh immigration penalties such as
deportation.1 6 ' This is especially true in states like New Mexico with high
populations of non-citizens.
The distrust of a broad rule such as the one in New Mexico after Paredezrevolves
around the "slippery slope" argument.'66 However, by requiring only a "manageable
amount of basic spadework,"' 67 a defense attorney can nearly guarantee the constitutionality of guilty pleas. 68 With regard to the decision in Paredez, this "spadework"
would begin with one simple question: are you a U.S. citizen, a lawful permanent
resident, or an undocumented immigrant? If the client answers that he or she is not
a U.S. citizen, the attorney would then be required to research applicable
immigration law and to effectively communicate the findings to the client.
1. Requirement Against Giving Faulty Advice
In considering the issue of informing non-citizen defendants about immigration
consequences, several courts have vacated guilty pleas when defendants were
affirmatively misinformed by counsel. 69 This type of an approach certainly seems
to consider the severity of
like a step in the right direction even though it neglects
70
harm that a defense attorney's silence could trigger.

160.

Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036,

11, 101 P.3d at 803.

161. It might be argued that the "slippery slope" rationale is more persuasive regarding the trial court than
defense counsel because of the latter's general role in personally protecting the interests of the defendant. See Chin
& Holmes, supranote 33, at 737.
162. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, I 11, 101 P.3d at 803.
163. Id. 19, 101 P.3d at 805.
164. Id.
165. McDermid, supra note 35, at 741.
166. Gabriel Chin and Richard Holmes refer to this argument as the "'floodgates' objection." Chin & Holmes,
supra note 33, at 736; see also People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 532-33 (Colo. 1987) (Rovira, J., dissenting) (stating
that allowing deportation as an exception to the collateral consequences doctrine "opens the door to innumerable
challenges to pleas based on the defendant's ignorance of other serious collateral consequences").
167. Chin & Holmes, supra note 33, at 738.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
170. McDermid, supra note 35, at 754. A duty not to misinform is not the same thing as a duty to inform. A
vast majority of courts do not require defense counsel to inform non-citizens at all regarding immigration
consequences. Id. at 751-52. Others only recognize ineffective assistance when defense counsel's misinformation
affects the volition and knowledge of guilty pleas. Id. at 751-54.
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Paredezappropriately followed this line of thinking in determining that a defense
attorney's affirmative misrepresentation regarding the deportation consequences of
a guilty plea can be considered manifestly deficient. 7' The court in Paredez relied
principally on the Second Circuit Court's reasoning in United States v. Couto.'72
Couto held that defense counsel's performance was "objectively unreasonable" and
thus deficient when the immigration consequences of a guilty plea were affirmatively misrepresented to the defendant.' 73 Similarly, a year after Couto was decided,
the Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 74 held that "by advising
Defendant he 'might or might not' be deported, Defendant's counsel affirmatively
misrepresented the deportation consequences of Defendant's plea," and thus
satisfied the first (performance) prong of the Strickland test. 75 However, RojasMartinez was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court on appeal in November 2005.'76
Paredez appropriately applied and accepted the logic set forth in Couto and by
the Utah Court of Appeals in Rojas-Martinez'" regarding the issue of misinformation. 7 8 More importantly, Paredez determined that this limitation on defense
attorneys by itself is not enough."' The misinformation rule alone "entitles
defendants to effective representation of their interests as noncitizens, but only if
they ask for it."' 80 Taking this logic into account, Paredezcontinued past the isolated
issue of misinformation to completely eliminate the gap between faulty advice and
non-advice.' 8'
2. Affirmative Obligation to Give Advice
The "misinformation only" approach is essentially a "don't ask--don't tell"
policy. 82 The major concern with such a policy is that it tends to dissuade attorneys
from rendering any advice at all in fear that giving bad advice will result in a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.' 83 This approach "discourages attorneys from
offering [crucial] advice" to non-citizen criminal defendants at critical times. "8The

171. State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 115, 101 P.3d 799, 804.
172. 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002); see Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 15, 101 P.3d at 804.
173. Couto, 311 F.3d at 188. In Couto, the defendant's attorney erroneously informed her that "there were
many things that could be done to prevent her from being deported" after agreeing to a guilty plea. Id. at 183.
However, due to the nature of the crime committed, the acceptance of the plea meant that she would almost certainly
be deported. Id. at 183-84; accord United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defense counsel's performance was deficient when he claimed to understand immigration law, gave erroneous
advice regarding deportation consequences, and failed to correct his misleading representations in a timely manner).
174. 73 P.3d 967 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 125 P.3d 930 (Utah 2005).
175. Id. at 970; see also Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921, 925 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the use of the
word "may" in advising about deportation consequences implies that deportation will not be almost certain), rev'd,
134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006).
176. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930 (Utah 2005).
177. See supra notes 174, 176 and accompanying text.
178. State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036,i 15, 101 P.3d 799, 804.
179. Id. 1 16, 101 P.3d at 804.
180. McDermid, supra note 35, at 754. This type of policy does not place any affirmative obligation on
attorneys to advise clients. However, if they choose to say anything at all they may not give faulty or misleading
advice without the possibility of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Francis, supra note 1, at 726.
181. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 16, 101 P.3d at 804 (departing from Tenth Circuit precedent).
182. Francis, supranote 1, at 726.
183. Id.
184. Id. If an attorney is discouraged from offering immigration advice to non-citizen clients regarding
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New Mexico Supreme Court in Paredez analyzed these concerns in coming to its
conclusion that faulty advice and no advice are not distinguishable.'85
Jurisdictions that do not consider failing to advise about deportation consequences as ineffective assistance of counsel generally rely on the fact that deportation is fundamentally a collateral consequence.' 86 The Tenth Circuit has followed
this line of thinking since its 1992 decision in Varela v. Kaiser.87 Varela held that
"deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal proceeding and therefore the
failure to advise does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.' ' 188 Twelve
years later, in 2004, Varela was reaffirmed in Broomes v. Ashcroft. 189 Broomes,
unlike Varela, was decided after both the AEDPA and the LJRIRA had passed
through Congress, making deportation an inevitable consequence stemming from
the conviction of a broad range of crimes.19° Despite the new post-1996 inevitability
of deportation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed its outdated line of reasoning.'19
The passage of the IHRIRA and the AEDPA has immensely increased the
likelihood of the deportation of criminal defendants convicted of or pleading guilty
to "aggravated felonies."' 92 A non-citizen's guilty plea to an aggravated felony now
leads almost automatically to immediate deportation. 9 3 The argument logically
follows that because of its close connection to the guilty plea and the overall severity
of the consequence, deportation should be treated as if it were a direct consequence. 94 Treating deportation this way would require non-citizens' defense
attorneys to affirmatively advise them of deportation consequences so that they can
make plea agreements. '9 This is exactly the rule that
knowingly and voluntarily
96
1
Paredez.
of
out
came
The rule in Paredez that requires affirmative advisement from defense counsel
is quite revolutionary.' 9' Of the very few jurisdictions that require some type of

possible deportation consequences, the clients are forced to "discern complex legal issues" on their own. Id. Noncitizen clients are likely to have economic and linguistic barriers and may find it extremely difficult to find a way
to make sense of complicated federal immigration law. See id.
185. Paredez, 2004 NMSC-036, 16, 101 P.3d at 804.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that a consequence is
collateral if it is not explicitly within the control of the trial court).
187. 976 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1992).
188. Id. at 1358.
189. 358 F.3d 1251, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Accordingly, deportation remains a coliateral consequence
of a criminal conviction, and counsel's failure to advise a criminal defendant of its possibility does not result in a
Sixth Amendment deprivation."). Paredez directly departed from the Tenth Circuit's holding in Broomes by
refusing to draw a distinction between faulty advice and no advice. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 16, 101 P.3d at
804.
190. See supra Part i.A.
191. Broomes, 358 F.3d at 1256 ("[W]e summarily reject Mr. Broomes' claim that Varela was wrongly
decided.").
192. McDermid, supra note 35, at 762.
193. Id. This applies to both undocumented immigrants and legal permanent residents (that is, green card
holders). See, e.g., Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 2, 101 P.3d at 801 (classifying the defendant as a "permanent
resident alien from Guatemala").
194. See McDermid, supra note 35, at 763.
195. See id. at 763-64.
196. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 19, 101 P.3d at 805 ("If a client is a non-citizen, the attorney must advise
that client of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation would be
virtually certain.").
197. The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States either do not require any type of requirement to
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affirmative duty (California and Colorado), none have developed such a clear-cut
and straightforward rule as the New Mexico rule in Paredez.198 The number of
jurisdictions that require defense counsel to affirmatively advise clients of
immigration consequences is surprisingly small despite the general support from
several major legal organizations, namely the American Bar Association and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers." 9 Despite the general trend
toward not requiring affirmative advice from attorneys, Paredez thoughtfully
incorporated the minority rule and should serve as a model for other jurisdictions.
C. A PotentialProblem: Failureto Analyze the Claim Under the New Mexico
Constitution
Despite the workable and conscientious result that Paredezreached, one specific
potential problem remains: the failure of the New Mexico Supreme Court to analyze
the issue in terms of the state constitution. Such a failure has left the Paredez
decision vulnerable to being overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court.2tu
In PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins,20 ' the U.S. Supreme Court explained
that each state of the union has a "sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.,, 20 2 This right essentially leaves each state free to interpret the provisions
of its own constitution without having to strictly adhere to a more conservative
interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding a parallel provision in the
Federal Constitution."°3 Because the Court's decisions regarding the Constitution are
not "mechanically applicable to state law issues," 2°4 each state supreme court must
individually decide upon a method of interpreting its own constitution.2 5
Seven years after the Gomez decision accepted the interstitial approach in New
Mexico, 2°6 the question of preserving a state constitutional claim never arose in State

address immigration concerns stemming from guilty pleas or only establish a duty for defense attorneys not to
misinform their clients regarding these concerns. Francis, supra note 1, at 724-25.
198. California requires that once an attorney is aware of his or her client's nationality, the attorney must
research how immigration laws will affect criminal cases. People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336 (Ct. App.
1987). Similar to California, Colorado obligates defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients about immigration
consequences only if he or she has knowledge that the defendant is not a U.S. citizen. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523,
529 (Colo. 1987).
199. The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice advise practitioners to fully inform noncitizens of the possible immigration consequences of guilty pleas. Francis, supra note 1, at 724; see Paredez, 2004NMSC-036,
18, 101 P.3d at 805. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers recognizes the
importance of determining the immigration status of all clients and encourages attorneys to conform to professional
standards in researching any possible immigration consequences to guilty pleas. See Francis, supra note 1, at
723-24.
200. See supra Part ll.C.2.
201. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
202. Id. at81.
203. See id.; see also Brennan, supra note 67, at 502 ("[T]he decisions of the [U.S. Supreme] Court are not,
and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law.").
204. Brennan, supra note 67, at 502. Brennan continued by warning practitioners that, "although in the past
it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it would be most
unwise these days not to raise the state constitutional questions." Id.
205. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 68, at 1331-67 (providing a history and analysis of
the various methods of state constitutional interpretation).
206. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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v. Paredez.2 °7 The reasoning in Paredez focused exclusively on the federal
constitutional right to counsel (Sixth Amendment) and failed to mention its parallel
provision in the New Mexico Constitution (article II, section 14).208In Paredez, the
court appropriately looked to federal case law to determine whether the right to be
warned of immigration consequences to guilty pleas was protected by the Federal
Constitution. 2°9 However, because the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly
established such a right,2 1° it would have been prudent to assert the defendant's
rights on state constitutional grounds in the trial court. 21 ' The interstitial approach
requires a showing that either the New Mexico Constitution already offers such a
protection or a description as to why the New Mexico constitutional right to counsel
should be interpreted more liberally than its federal counterpart.2 12 Because neither
of these assertions were made in Paredez, it is uncertain if the right of defendants
in New Mexico to be affirmatively advised of the risk of deportation upon entering
a guilty plea is protected by the New Mexico Constitution.
Had the Paredez court made its decision on state constitutional grounds that the
right to counsel includes being informed of immigration consequences to guilty
pleas, the principles of federalism would have precluded the U.S. Supreme Court
from ever second guessing the decision.1 3 However, since the court made the
decision under a federal constitutional approach, Paredez can potentially be
overruled sub silentio if the U.S. Supreme Court ever makes a decision on the issue
that is in conflict with the New Mexico decision.2" 4

207. However, the Gomez decision has been cited and applied in a large number of New Mexico Supreme
Court decisions since 1997. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 13, 74 P.3d 73, 77 (applying the Gomez
interstitial approach to a question of double jeopardy); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, 14, 25 P.3d
225, 230-31 (applying the Gomez approach in determining the legality of a stop at a U.S. border checkpoint); N.M.
Right to Choose v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, 1 25, 975 P.2d 841, 850 (examining whether the New Mexico
Constitution afforded greater protection than the U.S. Constitution regarding state funding for medically necessary
abortions); State v. Vallejos, 1997-NMSC-040, 35, 945 P.2d 957, 967 (applying the Gomez interstitial approach
to a case involving a question of due process arising from alleged police entrapment).
208. See State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, Yj 13-14, 101 P.3d 799, 804. Compare N.M. CONsT. art. I, §
14 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend himself in person, and by
counsel.....), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.. .have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence."). The defendant-petitoner's brief in chief did not address either Gomez or issues
pertaining to the New Mexico Constitution. Brief of Defendant-Petitioner, State v. Paredez, No. 28,270 (N.M.
2004). However, the amicus brief, while neglecting to mention Gomez, briefly discusses the New Mexico
constitutional guarantee to counsel and a single state case that addresses the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Brief for New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting DefendantPetitioner at 7, State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 101 P.3d 799 (No. 28,270) (citing State v. Lopez, 1996-NMSC036, 920 P.2d 1017 (1996)).
209. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
210. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of whether defendants have the right to
be informed of immigration consequences to guilty pleas, several circuits have held that such a right does not exist
under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004).
211. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
214. In 1983, in Michigan v. Long, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a state court opinion
appears to rest primarily on federal law,.. .and when the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so.
463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). Thirteen years later, this line of thinking led the Court to overturn a decision of

Summer 2006]

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES

OF GUILTY PLEAS

Currently, Paredez is good law that is based on the New Mexico Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal constitutional law. However, should the U.S. Supreme
Court ever decide to rule in favor of not granting defendants the right to be informed
in another case, Paredez would disappear. If this were to happen, the Paredez rule
could later be reestablished via a different case under the New Mexico Constitution.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Aside from the potential problems that the Paredez decision could face in the
future, its present impact on the New Mexico bar is quite strong. Paredez newly
25
requires three distinct things of criminal defense attorneys. First, a good faith
2 16
effort must be made to understand the immigration status of each and every client.
Second, thorough research must be conducted to determine the potential effects that
21 7
the attorney must
a guilty or no contest plea would have on that status. Finally,
218 These requirements
adequately communicate all pertinent findings to the client.
219
expected to fulfill.
are quite similar to the normal ethical duties that an attorney is
A. New Requirements of CriminalDefense Attorneys After Paredez
The first step of this process, requiring criminal defense attorneys to "gather basic°
22
information about the client's immigration status and the offense charged,
criminal
consists of a simple line of questioning. Essentially, the New Mexico
22 1
a lawful
citizen
U.S.
a
is
she
or
he
defense attorney must ask the client whether
22 2 or an undocumented alien. 223 If the client answers
permanent resident,
affirmatively to either of the latter two, the attorney must then determine the
224
possible immigration ramifications of a potential plea.
the Ohio Supreme Court that interpreted the Fourth Amendment. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996). In
Robinette, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that even though the Ohio Supreme Court opinion mentioned the
search and seizure provision of the Ohio Constitution, "the only cases [the opinion] discusses or even cites are
federal cases, except for one state case which itself applies the Federal Constitution." Id. at 37. Therefore, because
the opinion relied on federal law, the Court, as the ultimate arbiter of federal law, could exercise its jurisdiction and
ultimately rule on the legitimacy of the decision of the state supreme court. See id.
215. See Brief for New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 28, State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 101 P.3d 799 (No. 28,270).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2002) ("Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill
consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any
R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must.. .act with commitment and dedication to the
particular specialized knowledge."); id.
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
220. McDermid, supra note 35, at 778.
221. A U.S. citizen is either a person that was born in the United States or territories of the United States or
a person that obtained "citizenship through naturalization after periods of lawful permanent residence." ONG HING,
supra note 103, at 79.
222. A "lawful permanent resident alien" is "a person who has immigrated lawfully to the United States." Id.
at 188.
223. An "undocumented alien" is "a person who has entered the United States without inspection or
surreptitiously." id. at 303. This category may also include people that have overstayed the period of time granted
on a non-immigrant visa (such as a student). Id.
224. The Colorado Supreme Court gave great weight to this step in People v. Pozo. 746 P.2d 523, 529 (Colo.
1987). As a result, the rule in Colorado is that if defense counsel has "sufficient information to form a reasonable
belief that the client was in fact an alien,...he may be required to investigate relevant immigration law." Id.; see also
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The second step of this process, provided that the client is not a U.S. citizen, is
to research the applicable immigration law. Some non-immigration specialists will
find this body of administrative law particularly difficult to interpret. 225 However,
this process should not be considered an undue burden on New Mexico defense
attorneys. On the contrary, the option to consult an immigration specialist can be
both time and cost effective.226 Most importantly, it may save the client the
possibility of mistakenly agreeing to permanent banishment from the United States
and separation from his or her family.
The final step of this process is to communicate potential immigration
consequences to non-citizen criminal defendants so that they can "make intelligent
decisions about their own fates. '227 At this step, the New Mexico criminal defense
attorney must affirmatively advise his or her client as to potential immigration
consequences of guilty pleas.228 Such an advisement aims to achieve a knowing and
intelligent plea agreement. 229 This information relayed from attorney to client aims
to ensure that the defendant does not waive his or her right to a trial "without first
knowing that doing so can separate them from their families and the country they
230
know of as home.,
B. DisciplinaryRamifications of Paredez Violations
After Paredez, if a New Mexico criminal defense attorney neglects to advise his
or her client of the specific risk of deportation from entering a guilty plea, the
defendant will have a very strong ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 23' If such
a claim is ultimately successful, the defendant will be allowed to withdraw his or her
plea.232 This constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel should not be
confused with the attorney's role in providing effective assistance.233 The Sixth

State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145, 1151 (Kan. 2002) (explaining that a showing that defense counsel knew or should
have known that the client was not a U.S. citizen would require a duty to investigate immigration issues).
225. See generally Francis, supra note 1, at 697-707 (explaining the intricacies of the evolution of
immigration law since the mid-1980s pertaining to its impact on non-citizens convicted of crimes).
226. McDermid, supra note 35, at 778 (stating that a consultation with an immigration specialist could take
as little as five minutes and cost as little as ten dollars).
227. Id.
228. State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 19, 101 P.3d 799, 805.
229. See Bogdan, supra note 154, at 66.
230. Francis, supra note i, at 735. Under federal law, a person "whose removal was subsequent to a
conviction for commission of an aggravated felony...shall be... imprisoned not more than 20 years [for illegal
reentry]." 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2000). Such a harsh punishment for reentry following deportation for a guilty plea
to an aggravated felony is quite significant for the deportee whose entire family is located in the United States or
who came to the United States at a young age and has no meaningful personal, cultural, or linguistic connection to
his or her country of citizenship.
231. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 19, 101 P.3d at 805.
232. Id. 24, 101 P.3d at 806.
233. Because of the language used in Paredez, the affitrmative obligations placed on criminal defense
attorneys might be facially confused with an attorney's ethical obligations. See id. 19, 101 P.3d at 805. However,
the case does not explicitly have to do with attorneys' ethical obligations; rather, it has to do with defendants'
constitutional rights. Id. ("An attorney's failure to provide the required advice regarding immigration consequences
will be ineffective assistanceof counsel....") (emphasis added). Therefore, if an attorney violates his or her Paredez
obligation, there is not necessarily an ethical violation.
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Amendment simply grants rights to the defendant; it does not mandate certain
behavior of attorneys.234
It may be argued that when a defendant makes a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, he or she is making two fundamental complaints.2 35 First, that the state
236 and
has "abandon[ed] its constitutional obligation to exercise its police powers,
second, that "the legal community has failed to control its own members.,

237

The

former complaint seeks to assure that the defendant's constitutional rights are
protected; the latter seeks to punish the attorney for breaching ethical duties. The
two complaints may seem similar, but in reality they have no formal relationship to
each other.238
Although the identical triggering misconduct by a criminal defense attorney
might give rise to a disciplinary complaint resulting in a disciplinary sanction,
a successful legal malpractice action, and/or a reversal of a criminal conviction
based upon a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, each of these
proceedings is separate, each relies upon the satisfaction of different legal tests,
and the fact that a criminal defense attorney's misconduct has been conclusively
established in one setting will not inevitably dictate the same result in a
proceeding in one of the other venues.239
Today, if a New Mexico criminal defense attorney violates the rule in Paredez
24
there is no absolute guarantee that he or she will face disciplinary sanctions. If a
complaint is made and there is a disciplinary hearing, a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel may be considered as a factor, but is not, by itself, dispositive
of a finding of ethical misconduct. 24 1 Overall, it is highly unlikely that a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Paredezcould be considered heinous
enough to constitute an ethical violation without other accompanying ethical
violations.242

234. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("[T]he accused shall enjoy the right..,to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.") (emphasis added).
235. Timothy J. Lucey, Comment, Bellamy v. Cogdell: The Ethical Implications of Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 549, 550 (1993).
236. Id.
237. Id. In New Mexico, the rules of professional conduct are promulgated, defined, and regulated by the New
Mexico Supreme Court. NMSA 1978, § 36-2-1 (1941).
238. JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAw AND LIABILITY § 1:8 (2d ed. 2005) ("Professional
disciplinary proceedings have no formal relationship to judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, which might also
touch upon questions of the propriety of a criminal defense attorney's conduct.").
239. Id.
240. Given the ease of complying with the obligation, it might be argued that disciplinary sanctions should
follow a Paredez violation. See supra Part VI.A.
241. See In re Reif, 121 N.M. 758, 761, 918 P.2d 344, 347 (1996) (considering a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel as merely one factor in determining whether to sanction an attorney facing disciplinary
complaints). Arizona has directly considered this issue and has refused to adopt a per se rule that equates a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel with an ethical violation. In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. 1993).
Additionally, Wolfran explained that a finding that assistance of counsel at trial was effective would not per se
protect an attorney from professional discipline. Id.; see also Ariz. Ethics Opinion, Op. 98-02 (1998) ("Not every
instance of ineffective assistance will amount to a disciplinary violation.").
242. See, e.g., In re Reif, 121 N.M. 758, 918 P.2d 344 (issuing an attorney a twelve month suspension for
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failing to provide competent representation, failing to
comply with procedural rules in six different cases, and failing to provide effective assistance to a criminal
defendant); see also Fla. Bar v. Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d 583, 584 n. I (Fla. 1992) ("We note that most cases of
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C. The Scope of the Decision
Apart from these direct implications of the Paredez decision, there is one final
and more abstract concern: the peripheral scope of the decision. This concern deals
with the "slippery slope" objection and whether ineffective assistance of counsel
claims could arise from collateral consequences to guilty pleas other than immigration consequences."' The Paredez decision has the potential to open the door to
arguments that counsel was ineffective by not advising clients of all possible
collateral consequences prior to entering a guilty plea. 244 However, such an
argument would almost certainly be rejected given the specific language of the
Paredez holding.245 Paredez specifically applies only to immigration consequences
of pleading guilty and not to collateral consequences in general. 246Overall, it is clear
that the New Mexico Supreme Court intended for the rule in Paredez to apply only
to the harshest of all collateral consequences: deportation.247
VII. CONCLUSION
New Mexico criminal defense attorneys must now affirmatively advise each and
every non-citizen client of the specific immigration consequences that a guilty or no
contest plea will trigger. If a defendant is not properly advised, he or she will be able
to withdraw his or her guilty plea. The requirement on criminal defense attorneys
takes a large step in assuring that the rights of New Mexicans who are not U.S.
citizens are protected. Deportation, although collateral to a guilty plea, is often much
harsher than any criminal penalty. The need for the criminal defendant to be aware
of the possibility of deportation is absolutely essential. Ultimately, as a result of
Paredez,there is a greater assurance that non-citizen defendants will enter guilty or
no contest pleas both knowingly and voluntarily and fully aware of the real consequences of that action.

ineffective assistance of counsel do not rise to the level of a disciplinary violation.").
243. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
244. The possible list of collateral consequences is virtually non-exhaustive. For a listing of the consequences
that could stem from guilty or no contest pleas, see supra note 34.
245. See State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 19, 101 P.3d 799, 805.
246. Id. ("An attorney's failure to provide the required advice regarding immigration consequences will be
ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant suffers prejudice by the attorney's omission.") (emphasis added).
247. id. The Paredez opinion is delivered entirely in the context of immigration concerns. The court
recognized the severity of deportation and counsel's duty to advise regarding immigration consequences regardless
of its classification as a collateral consequence. Id. 1 18, 101 P.3d at 805. Furthermore, the court repeatedly
established that the rule in the case will only be applied to immigration consequences of guilty or no contest pleas.
See id. 16, 101 P.3d at 804 ("We go one step further, though, and hold that an attorney's non-advice to an alien
defendant on the immigration consequences of a guilty plea would also be deficient performance.") (emphasis
added).

